Ficticious Florida Case/ pro se

[Rev. Joshua Snider]

One love Brothers and Sisters!

I'm not an attorney and I'm not qualified to write legal doccuments of any kind including drafting pleadings for anybody else to use. The majority of the following material I did not write with the exceptions of editing. I have however tried my best to understand all of this by studying for many hours over the past few months. That is what anybody fighting a case should be doing, and Brother Carl's policy of suing before you get arrested is probably the only good suggestion. My understanding is probably still not verry good. The material has been largely taken from real filings by individuals with real cases and as those individuals can tell you, so far their success has been marginal at best. None of these people are attorneys either. Any material I have added has been added from the perspective of, if I were living in Florida, where Brother Jeff and Brother Michael and Sister Victoria are trying to litigate their cases, and had been busted, how would I try to fight my case. I have been in contact with both Jeff and Michael and have gotten alot of feedback from both of them. Much of the Florida material has been taken directly from Jeff's injunction that was just dismissed. I have not read those Florida cases that he was citing top to bottom, that is a mistake I'm making in my ficticious case below. Even with the federal cases I'm citing, I haven't read all of them top to bottom and this is another mistake I am making. I am probably also making many other mistakes I am not aware of yet. The name's of the ficticious judge and prosecutor have been drawn from figures in Icelandic history so antiquitated that they cannot be copyrighted ( I probably could have used William Shakespear as a character). The most important part of the ficticious filling below is the exhibits (especcially the ones that reflect my sincerity[which come from the sincere individual], and those that reflect safety, and lack of compelling government interest[which come in large part from our generous government] ). Most of the actual filings for the real cases can be found at http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/Default.aspx , http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal2/Default.aspx and http://www.firstchurchmagi.org/Modules/NewsManager/ShowCategories.aspx

One love,
Joshua


Ficticious background story for my ficticious bust I am now fighting

I was a practicing member of a Christian branch of the Hawai'i Cannabis (THC) Ministry residing and practicing at my residence somewhere in the bushes in the vicinty of Marco Island. One day officers of local law enforcement agencies came to my door to ask me if I had seen a fugitive that looked like a picture they showed to me. They said he was spotted in our area. I did not recognize the man and told the officers that. A few days later more officers showed up at my residence with a search warrant. The warrant said that earlier when officers were at my residence they detected the powerfull odor of marijuana and observed other signs that would implicate me in illegalI drug activities. I did not know how to contest the warrant and didn't see any option but to let the officers procede. I assumed that if I were to protest I would get an additional charge of obstructing justice. Much of my religious poperty was confiscated and I was arrested. After posting bond I sought out attorneys I finaly settled on one and paid my retainer upfront as opposed to puting it in escro allowing for withdrawls corresponding to itemized bills (big mistake). I also did not have the foresight to get a contract stating I had to be allowed to review anything and everything filed on my behalf and that nothing could be filed without my signature and that I needed reasonable time to review everthing. The attorney told me a might have an outside chance on a right to privacy claim but that the warrant was good and all the official procedure was good too. I could not get the attorney to make all of the claims I told him to make and for whatever reason he didn't seem to put much time or effort into anything I was giving him. With nothing to go on but my religion and the right to privacy. The attorney and I parted ways and because I was broke I had to get a public defender. This attorney didn't seem to want to cooperate either so then I had to procede pro se , and as we saw with brother Craig X my chances have now become slim to none I put together a motion and brief from other filings and statutes other people had helped me find, the bright side is that I'm about to get all of the evidence showing lack of harm into the record so that I've got what I need to appeal. These arguments we're appearantly rejected by real Florida attorney's so I'm betting I'm about to get my but kicked here. The Florida RFRA has a section exempting the drug laws from its application so I'm going to have to figure out how to deal with that problem, but I've decided to let the state bring that up first and try to do damage controll on a reply.

Many of the important exhibits are not cited in the motion but are cited instead in the brief, and they are all going to be very important.

This piece is still my rough draft and I still have to add a lot of numbers where I have left blankls and add citations where I have (citation ommitted for some reason).


PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Honorable Eggil Skalligrimson (made up judge)


Case No.

Joshua J. Snider
Defendant, Pro Se
Residence somewhere in the bushes
In the vicinity of Marco Island
__________________________________________/

Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney Snorre Sturlasson (made up prosecutor)
____? Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida (####)
___________________________________________/


MOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF FEDERAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, FLORIDA RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, FEDERAL RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OFTHE FIRST AMMENDMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH EQUAL PROTECTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 OF THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR HEARING OF FACTS UNDER THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST.

1. Defendant is a member of The Hawai'i Cannabis Ministry See wikipedia definition Exhibit #? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/THC_Ministry and a Reverend in that faith and is ordained through The Universal Life Church (ULC) Exhibit #?.

2. Ä9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in Cannabis, is the container of the Holy Spirit through which communion with YHVH, the Prophets, Jesus The Christ, the Saints, and the Defendant's fellow Christian Brothers and Sisters is observed and maintained. Thus the cultivation and consumption of Cannabis Sacrament is a mandatory, spiritual, and therapeutic Religious Establishment and Exercise observed by all members of his Faith.

3. Whole Cannabis and Hashish are within the incense of the alter and Cannabis is the Burning Bush through which Moses, Elijah, Ezra, and the other Priests and Prophets to follow, communed with God and is the means of Fire Baptism, see I Corinthians 10:1 "Moreover, brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; 2 And were all baptized unto Moses in the Cloud and in the sea; 3 And did all eat the same spiritual meat: for they drank of that Spiritual Rock that followed them: and that Rock was Christ".

Cannabis is also one of the ingredients of The Holy Anointing Oil of Moses and The Christening Oil of Jesus The Christ (see Religious Practitioner of Cannabis Affidavit Exhibit #? shown to officers and agents after they entered our Sanctuary, accurate copy attached), "The Living Torah" by Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan Exhibit #? http://www.thc-ministry.org/thelivingtorah.jpg and the "Witness Booklet" Exhibit #?). This Incense and Oil is manufactured and used in the Religious Establishment and Exercise of the Ministry in the Fire Baptism, Chrismation and prayerful healing of the sick as directed in Mark 6: 12-13 and James 5:14.

The Florida Supreme Court has recognized Cannabis as an historical Christian Sacrament. "The Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church is centuries old and has regularly used Cannabis as its sacrament". Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1979).. and the "Blood of Christ" description of Cannabis is consistent with "The Oil of the Spirit" Aramaic artifacts from the Temple of James The Just, and help to convey the understanding of receiving the Holy Spirit by Fire through THC, See Exhibit# (?) http://yourarmstoisrael.org/Articles_new/notes/?page=AncientSymbol Perhaps an ex post Facto thing here.
4. Defendant demonstrates a prima facie violation showing: 1.) that the laws against marijuana as applied to him substantially burden his sincere, legitimate, spiritual, and therapeutic Establishment and Exercise of Religion through the sacramental use of marijuana; and (2) that he qualifies for protection under the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (citation omitted for some reason), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution under Equal Protection as articulated in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ("Smith" herein after), Article 1, Section 3 of the Florida State Constitutionand the Fundamental Right to Privacy Article I section 23 of the Florida Constitution.
5. Under the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (citation omitted for some reason), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution under Equal Protection as articulated in "Smith", Article 1, Section 3 of the Florida State Constitutionand the Fundamental Right to Privacy Article I section 23 of the Florida Constitution, the government: (1) bears the burden of establishing a compelling interest in applying the drug laws to the Defendant; and (2) if the government can establish a compelling interest in applying the drug laws to the Defendant then the government bears the burden of proving that it is using the least restrictive means of doing so (that there is no less burdensome alternative).
6. Defendant seeks a determination of his rights under the standards of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA" hereafter), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb(4), as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006), slip opinion attached as Exhibit # ? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/exhibit_02.pdf ("UDV" hereafter), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA" hereafter), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc(5), as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005) ("Cutter" hereafter), and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
7. Defendant asserts a claim under RLUIPA because: 1) RLUIPA amends and is therefore part of the RFRA, 2) he is on a conditional pretrial release in the form of bond. Broad construction of the RLUIPA means that any deprivation of liberty by a state law enforcement agency would fit the meaning of a pre-trial detention by institution as described in RLUIPA. Congress has applied the RFRA to the states' drug laws as it originally intended to do in the original language of the RFRA.
8. The State of Florida receives federal funding for the enforcement of state drug laws and in so doing they are bound by the Federal Commerce and Spending Clause, as amended by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, to protect religious freedom in their enforcement of the state drug laws.
9. The State of Florida relies on and refers to the Federal CSA, created under the Federal Commerce and Spending Clause, and the state of Florida relies on and refers to the statutory application of federal drug laws in their enforcement of the state drug laws.

10. The Florida drug laws are not neutral towards religion or generally applicable under the interpretation of equal protection and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protection in Smith because the state has not challenged the authority of Congress in creating an exemption for Peyote, Florida law recognizes medical necessity for marijuana and the federal government distributes medical marijuana to patients in the State of Florida Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch...exhibit_08.pdf and Exhibit # , there exists a judicially crafted exemption for DMT and the dangerous sacramental substances, alcohol and tobacco have both been explicitly exempted from the Controlled Substance Act

The DEA Administrative Law Judge Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch...exhibit_01.pdf and the Courts considering the toxicity, safety and relative dangers of Cannabis or marijuana have consistently found that there is no substantial risk, threat or danger.

State Medical Statutes: Since 1988, eleven states, Alaska Statutes § 17.37 (2007), California Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (2006), Colorado Constitution Article XVIII, Section 14 (2006), Hawaii Revised Statutes § 329-121 (2006), 22 Maine Revised Statutes § 2383-B (2005), Montana Code Annotated § 50-46-101 (2006), Nevada Constitution Article 4 § 38 (2006) - Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 453A.010 (2006), Oregon Revised Statutes § 475.300 (2006), Rhode Island General Laws § 21-28.6-1 (2006), 18 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 4471 (2006), Revised Code Washington (ARCW) § 69.51A.005 (2006), have passed laws protecting the medical use of marijuana. All of these states allow medical marijuana use, possession, and cultivation, proving that there is no immediate threat to public health and safety from these activities (See the Defendant's Brief of Law attached to this motion for specific language).

11.Defendant cites International Laws and Treaties Exhibit #(?) as evidence of National and International intent to protect Religious Freedom and as such as Exhibits for trial.

12. The cultivation and consumption of cannabis is mandated by the Defendant's religion. The Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (citation omitted for some reason), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution under Equal Protection as articulated in "Smith", Article 1, Section 3 of the Florida State Constitutionand the Fundamental Right to Privacy Article I section 23 of the Florida Constitution, and these charges must be dismissed.




























BRIEF IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO DISMISS CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF FEDERAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, FLORIDA RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, FEDERAL RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OFTHE FIRST AMMENDMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH EQUAL PROTECTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 OF THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR HEARING OF FACTS UNDER THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST.
Legislative History

United States law regarding the protection of religious freedom has recently been amended by the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 1815; 74 U.S.L.W. 4119 (February 21, 2006) (UDV hereafter), which upholds the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b)(2004) (RFRA hereafter) restoring the compelling interest test abandoned by the United States Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith hereafter) (ruling that religious believers may not obtain exemptions to religion-neutral laws of general applicability that infringe on their religious practices). The decision in Smith was in the narrow context of an unemployment claim at a time when there was not yet a State recognized exemption for peyote.

The Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act specifically states that its
purpose is to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972 ) and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
exercise is substantially burdened by government.
The Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act says exactly the same
thing. In the Preamble the Legislature says "WHEREAS, it is the intent of the
Legislature of the State of Florida to establish the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, to guarantee its
application in All cases where free exercise is substantially burdened, and to
provide a claim or defense.

The States burden under the Compelling Interest Test is to show actual harm caused by the defendants Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion, and if such harm can be shown the State must show they have used the least restrictive means of preventing that harm.

The United States Supreme Court stated, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 430, 431 (2006),
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government's categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law "to the person" -- the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). RFRA expressly adopted the compelling interest test "as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972)." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). In each of those cases, this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.


The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act expanded protection beyond that of the Supreme Court of the United States, see Warner v. Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
" We hold that the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act expands the scope of religious protection beyond the conduct considered protected by cases from the United States Supreme Court. We also hold that under the Act, any law, even a neutral law of general applicability, is subject to the strict scrutiny standard where the law substantially burdens the free exercise of religion."
The State has failed to present any evidence of any harm to the public health safety to this Court to justify enforcing the federal and state drug laws against the Defendant for the Sacramental use of Marijuana, Freedom of Assembly and Worship with other Members of his Faith, and Establishment and Exercise his Religion.
The United States Supreme Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,(2006), "Congress' express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated applications of the test."
Constitutional challenges to a statute are pure issues of law to be
reviewed de novo City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).
The least restrictive means test has been defined as follows; It is therefore the least restrictive means of inquiry which is the critical aspect of the free exercise analysis. This prong forces us to measure the importance of a regulation by ascertaining the marginal benefit of applying it to all individuals, rather than to all individuals except those holding a conflicting religious conviction. If the compelling goal can be accomplished despite the exemption of a particular individual, then a regulation which denies an exemption is not the least restrictive means of furthering the state interest. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F. 2d 1269, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1981).
The strict scrutiny of the compelling interest test and the least restrictive means analysis is now required. Prior to the decision in Gonzales v. O Centro, intermediate scrutiny was more open to interpretation and the rational basis test was still routinely being employed under Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), instead of the compelling interest test and least restrictive means analysis. See United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549 (9th Cir. 1996) (personal use and possession of marijuana protected by RFRA). The analysis in Gonzales v. O Centro went beyond the analysis in Bauer because it protected both the importation and distribution of a controlled substance and not just mere personal use and possession). The RFRA has also been amended subsequent to the decision in Bauer.

United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Bauer " hereafter), was the first court to recognize that United States v. Leary is no longer good law under the RFRA:
The district court first found that the challenged law substantially burdened the free exercise of the Rastafarian religion. Relying on several earlier appellate cases, the district court held, however, "that the government has an overriding interest in regulating marijuana." The district court quoted Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969), as follows: "'It would be difficult to imagine the harm which would result if the criminal statutes against marihuana were nullified as to those who claim the right to possess and traffic in this drug for religious purposes. For all practical purposes the anti-marihuana laws would be meaningless, and enforcement impossible.'" The district court concluded that the government's in limine motion would have been granted even if the Religious Freedom Restoration Act had been the law of the land at the time.
United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d at 1557.
The district court treated the existence of the marijuana laws as dispositive of the question whether the government had chosen the least restrictive means of preventing the sale and distribution of marijuana. The district court relied on a drug case decided before the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. We do not exclude the possibility that the government may show that the least restrictive means of preventing the sale and distribution of marijuana is the universal enforcement of the marijuana laws. Under RFRA, however, the government had the obligation, first, to show that the application of the marijuana laws to the defendants was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and, second, to show that the application of these laws to these defendants was the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. The Act was relevant to the counts of simple possession.
Bauer was analyzed and decided under the original language of the RFRA. The RLUIPA amended the RFRA by expanding the definition of religious exercise. Religious beliefs do not have to be recognized by any established religion or system of religious belief to be protected under the RFRA. If the individual is compelled to act because of a personal religious belief, then that is now protected by the RFRA as amended by the RLUIPA. Further, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005), the United States Supreme Court specifically referred to United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), as the proper legal standard for determining whether religious beliefs are "truly held.". Seeger was an atheist who was granted conscientious objector status.
See also, Navajo Nation v. Forest Service, No. 06-15371, No. 06-15436, No. 06-15455 (9th Cir. March 12, 2007), pages 12-17:
In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997), the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments because it exceeded Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 529, 534-35. The Court did not, however, invalidate RFRA as applied to the federal government. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding RFRA constitutional as applied to the federal government). Three years later, in response to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.). RLUIPA prohibits state and local governments from imposing substantial burdens on the exercise of religion through prisoner or land-use regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1. In addition, RLUIPA replaced RFRA's original, constitution-based definition of "exercise of religion" with the broader definition quoted above. RLUIPA §§ 7-8, 114 Stat. at 806-07. Under RLUIPA, and under RFRA after its amendment by RLUIPA in 2000, "exercise of religion" is defined to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A).

In several ways, RFRA provides greater protection for religious practices than did the Supreme Court's pre-Smith free exercise cases. First, as we have previously noted, RFRA "goes beyond the constitutional language that forbids the 'prohibiting' of the free exercise of religion and uses the broader verb 'burden': a government may burden religion only on the terms set out by the new statute." United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1558 (9th Cir. 1996) (as amended). Cf. U.S. Const. amd. 1 ("Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (198 ("The crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit': 'For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.'" (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring))).

Second, as the Supreme Court noted in City of Boerne, RFRA provides stronger protection for free exercise than the First Amendment did under the pre-Smith cases because "the Act imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement -- a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify." 521 U.S. at 535.

Third, RFRA provides broader protection for free exercise because it applies Sherbert's compelling interest test "in all cases" where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). Prior to Smith, the Court had refused to apply the compelling interest analysis in various contexts, exempting entire classes of free exercise cases from such heightened scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 ("In recent years, we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all."); see, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1987) (not applicable to prison regulations); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1986) (Burger, J., for plurality) (not applicable in enforcing "facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for the administration of welfare programs"); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986) (not applicable to military regulations).

Finally, and perhaps most important, Congress expanded the statutory protection for religious exercise in 2000 by amending RFRA's definition of "exercise of religion." Under the amended definition -- "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief" -- RFRA now protects a broader range of religious conduct than the Supreme Court's interpretation of "exercise of religion" under the First Amendment. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 995 n.21 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting same). To the extent that our RFRA cases prior to RLUIPA depended on a narrower definition of "religious exercise," those cases are no longer good law. See, e.g., Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (burden must prevent adherent "from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates" and must be "an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine" (quoting Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987)); Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996) (no substantial burden because prisoner was not prevented from "engaging in any practices mandated by his religion"); Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs failed to establish "a substantial burden on a central tenet of their religion"). The district court in this case therefore erred by disregarding the amended definition and requiring Appellants to prove that the proposed action would prevent them "from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates." 408 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (quoting Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000), decided before RLUIPA's passage) (emphasis added).
In United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-549Z (W.D. Wash., February 22, 2000)("Valrey" hereafter), the court applied the compelling interest tests of Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, concluding: "The Court will allow Mr. Valrey's personal use and possession of marijuana exclusively in connection with his practice of his religion."
In United States v. Forchion, No. 04-949-ALL (E.D. Penn., July 22, 2005)(Forchion hereafter), the court remanded the case because the sentence did not take into consideration the RFRA:
Forchion and Duff maintain that Rastafarians are free to smoke marijuana in national parks, but the First Amendment does not guarantee any such right. To the extent that RFRA creates a potential defense to the possession charges of which they were convicted, Forchion and Duff failed to establish that defense because they did not prove that the criminalization of marijuana possession in Independence National Historical Park substantially burdens the exercise of Rastafarianism. Though their failure to establish a RFRA defense requires us to affirm their convictions, we shall vacate their sentences and remand this case for further proceedings because the magistrate judge did not consider whether six of the probation conditions that he imposed violate the Constitution and/or RFRA.
The Courts have recently taken note of the change in law caused by the UDV decision. Particularly instructive is the ruling in Multi Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Restafari, Inc. v. Gonzales, No. 3:06-cv-4264 (N.D. Cal. February 2, 2007) (MDMCR hereafter). This is the first case that actually takes both the RFRA and the decision in UDV into account. At pages 10-11, Judge Vaughn Walker wrote:
For reasons discussed infra, the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S Ct 1211, 1217, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006), shifted the legal terrain surrounding plaintiffs' suit, thereby warranting reexamination of the grounds for relief raised in plaintiffs' previous petition.

And at page 16:

Due to the case-by-case inquiry mandated by the O Centro decision, the RFRA forces courts into the awkward position of assessing the sincerity of a group's religious beliefs and then carving out exceptions to federal statutes in order to accommodate these beliefs. See O Centro , 126 S Ct at 1222 (concluding that the RFRA contemplates "judicially crafted exceptions" to federal laws) .Moreover, the stringent standard provided by the RFRA suggests that in delegating to the judicial branch the job of ensuring that federal law accommodates religion, Congress underestimated both the diversity of America's religious practices and the resourcefulness of its practitioners (and their attorneys). The present case thus serves as a prelude to the litigation to come.
Judge Walker dismissed all the claims against the Federal Defendants with prejudice except for the claims under the RFRA and invited the individual plaintiffs to re-file their claims under the RFRA.

In Raich v. Gonzales, No. 03-15481 (9th Cir. March 14, 2007)(Raich hereafter) footnote 8 at page 20, the Federal Government argued that marijuana was available through the Secretary of Health and Human Services:

The Government suggests that certain federal programs exist which might allow Raich to obtain marijuana lawfully. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to permit medical practitioners to design and implement research protocols using Schedule I substances, including marijuana, on a case-by-base basis). Amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and Marijuana Policy Project and Rick Doblin, Ph.D make abundantly clear that this is not a tenable "alternative." The program is highly restricted and has not accepted new medical marijuana patients since 1992.

At least two of the patients currently in this program live here in Florida and have been receiving 300 rolled marijuana cigarettes per month from the Federal Government for ______? years or more. Although the fundamental right to use marijuana as a medicine is not recognized by the courts at this time, there is a definite movement in that direction. In Raich v. Gonzales, No. 03-15481 (9th Cir. March 14, 2007) footnote 8 at pages 39-40, the Court wrote:

As stated above, Justice Anthony Kennedy told us that "times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. For now, federal law is blind to the wisdom of a future day when the right to use medical marijuana to alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed fundamental. Although that day has not yet dawned, considering that during the last ten years eleven states have legalized the use of medical marijuana, that day may be upon us sooner than expected. Until that day arrives, federal law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering. n16

n16 Because we find no fundamental right here, we do not address whether any law that limits that right is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02. We note, however, that, a recent Supreme Court case suggests that the Controlled Substances Act is not narrowly drawn when fundamental rights are concerned. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1221-23, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (Feb. 21, 2006) (observing that "mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day," and that the government had presented no evidence that narrow exceptions to the Schedule I prohibitions would undercut the government's ability to effectively enforce the Controlled Substances Act).

This is an area of the law where patterns of conduct and social mores are changing.
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the compelling interest test to an unemployment claim involving termination of employment for the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native American Church as it had previously applied the compelling interest test in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
In Smith, Justice Scalia explained that applying the compelling interest test to all laws would have a direct effect on the drug laws in the specific context of the marijuana laws, by citing Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989):

If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied
across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover,
if "compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering it down here
would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not
meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely
because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference," Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S., at 606, and
precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector,
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind -
[... other citations omitted ...] drug laws, see, e. g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement
Administration, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989) [... other
citations omitted ...]. The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does
not require this.

In response to the ruling in Smith Congress enacted the RFRA. This law provides that government action that substantially burdens religious exercise is invalid as applied to the individual unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive way to achieve that interest.

Responding to the RFRA, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507; 117 S. Ct. 2157; 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997) (hereinafter Boerne), the Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA, as applied to state laws that place incidental burdens on religion, exceeded Congress' power to interpret state protection of fundamental rights.

This Court should take notice that Boerne v Flores (which held RFRA to be unconstitutional as applied to the states) was about a zoning ordinance and not the absolute ban of a religion by the statutory implementation of federal drug laws to the state in the form of the state drug laws and the statutory application of the state drug laws to the Defendant.

There was no evidence introduced in Boerne that the zoning laws were not neutral toward religion or were not generally applicable to everyone. The drug laws, on the other hand, are neither neutral toward religion nor generally applicable as held by the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficent Unaio do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).

The Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio (Flores), applied for a building permit to enlarge the church in Boerne , Texas , which was denied based upon a "historic preservation" ordinance, and the church appealed that denial under the RFRA of 1993. The District Court concluded that Congress EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS ENFORCEMENT POWER under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional, and the US Supreme Court reversed again, holding that RFRA was UNCONSTITUTIONAL, as exceeding Congress' power." Congress, however, amended the law again by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons act of 2000.
COMMERCE AND SPENDING CLAUSE
The Federal Controlled Substances Act as amended by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is binding on the states by way of the Commerce and Spending Clause.

In response to Boerne Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (hereinafter RLUIPA), Pub. L. 106-274, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and used receipt of federal payments to states under the Commerce and Spending Clause to force the states to protect religious exercise to a greater extent than interpreted by the Supreme Court under the Smith decision and to amend RFRA by expanding the definition of religious exercise.

In 2005 the Supreme Court ruled that the RLUIPA is a valid exercise of congressional power, that it does apply to the states, and that receipt of federal funds paid to states do cause a contractual obligation on the state to perform to standards set in the Congressional / State contract in exchange for federal contributions to state managed programs. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709; 125 S. Ct. 2113; 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005).


PUBLIC LAW 103-344 [H.R. 4230]: October 6, 1994.
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power, "To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes. " Congress cited the Commerce and Spending Clause
as its authority for enacting the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 801

The Commerce and Spending Clause is also the authority the federal
Government uses to apply RLUIPA to the states. see Cutter v.
Wilkinson,

"RLUIPA's text applies to all laws passed by state and local governments, including 'rules of general applicability,' ibid., whether or not they concern an establishment of religion." Cutter, 544 U.S. , at page 732 (concurring opinion of Justice Thomas). "The States' voluntary acceptance of Congress' condition undercuts Ohio 's argument that Congress is encroaching on its turf." Cutter, 544 U.S. , at page 732 (concurring opinion of Justice Thomas).

The Commerce and Spending Clause is also the authority that the Federal Government used to show that the Federal drug law supersedes the State drug law in Raich v. Gonzales, No. 03-15481 (9th Cir. March 14, 2007.)

In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court wrote: "[A] primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets." Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is "'superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,'" however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. Wirtz, 392 U.S., at 196, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020, 88 S. Ct. 2017 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426, 69 L. Ed. 352, 45 S. Ct. 176 (1925)). See also 392 U.S. , at 195-196, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020, 88 S. Ct. 2017; Wickard, 317 U.S. , at 124, 87 L. Ed. 122, 63 S. Ct. 82 ("'[N]o form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress'").

Id. at 29.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA)

RLUIPA amended the RFRA by expanding the meaning of '
religious exercise" and by tying the RFRA's application to the states' voluntary acceptance of federal financial assistance
pursuant to Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce
and Spending Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.

42 U.S.C. 2000cc-2 states:
(a) General rule. No government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997), even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the
imposition of the burden to that person---

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.


(b) Scope of application. This section applies in any case in which--
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity
that receives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden effects, or removal of that substantial
burden would, affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States , or with Indian tribes.

Florida received _________________? dollars in 2006 for enforcementof the state drug laws. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement administers the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Formula Grant Program. The purpose is to, Provide state and local units of government grant funds in setting up projects designed to address the problems of illegal drug use and violent crime and to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system.

The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement
Assistance Formula Grant Program (Byrne Program) is administered
at the federal level by the U.S. Dept. of Justice. Byrne funds are
allocated to individual states via a population based formula.

Mandated distribution between local and state subgrants:

At least 61.56 % of the total federal grant award must be distributed
to local units of government

The remaining 38.44 % can be retained for state agency projects,
contingent upon approval by the Florida Legislature.

An annual report is submitted to the U.S. Dept. of Justice
each year. This document provides information on the statewide
accomplishments of the Byrne Program.

These reports show that the federal money is used to
enforce the State drug laws. It is used for drug
testing and in particular marijuana eradication. Also funds
go to Multi-Jurisdictional Task Forces which Coordinate
federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts toward the
common objectives of decreasing the supply of illegal drugs
and dismantling drug trafficking organizations.

The State of Florida is bound by both the Federal RFRA
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
because they have voluntarily contracted with the federal government in the enforcement of the Florida Drug laws. Total Estimated
FY 2007 Florida Substance Abuse and Drug Enforcement
Program Funding is __________.?


In 2006 the Supreme Court ruled that the RFRA applies to the federal drug laws, invalidating them where the government cannot prove a threat to public health and safety caused by the religious exercise of a church. See UDV. The UDV Church imports, receives money for, transports, distributes and uses DMT, a powerful Schedule I hallucinogen. The Supreme Court in UDV also ruled that the drug laws are not neutral towards religion or generally applicable making First amendment claims available under the Supreme Court ruling in Smith.
The Federal RFRA states at SEC. 6. APPLICABILITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.---This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of the Act.
Even though the RFRA was later amended, this court should take judicial notice that it was the intent of Congress in 1993 to impose the compelling interest test standard (strict scrutiny) on state drug laws (Smith was a case involving the application of the Oregon drug law to the religious use of a Schedule I controlled substance, Peyote). And that even as amended sec. 6 (a) of the RFRA "applies to all Federal......law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of the Act."
This would include any implementation of federal law by a state in the form of state laws.

The State of Florida invokes federal decisions relating to its drug laws.

F.S. 893.035 (11) In construing this section, due consideration and great weight should be given to interpretations of the U.S. Attorney General and the federal
courts relating to s.201 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 811, as amended and in effect on April 1, 1985.
All substantive rules adopted under this part shall not be inconsistent with
the rules of the U.S.Attorney General and the decisions of the federal courts
interpreting the provisions of s.201 of the Comprehensive Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 811, as amended and in effect on April, 1,
1985.

The State is bound by the interpretation of the First Amendment made by the United States Supreme Court in Smith and Boerne. In Smith and Boerne, the Supreme Court made it clear that "where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason." Boerne, 521 U.S. , at page 514; Smith, 494 U.S. , at page 884.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part Section 1...No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits even 'subtle departures from neutrality'. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed. 2d 472 (1993), cited by the Supreme Court as the applicable standard to drug laws ("Lukumi" hereafter).
If a law allows secular exemptions , government must have a compelling reason for refusing religious exemptions. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537. Thus, where a rule requiring police officers to be clean-shaven had an exemption for medically motivated beards. Lukumi required an exception for religiously motivated beards. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F. 3d 359, 366 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 56 (1999).
Florida's drug law has both a religious exception for a controlled substance and a medical necessity exception for marijuana.

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FOR PEYOTE


Congress' power to enforce Establishment and Free Exercise of
Religion with regard to the sacramental use of peyote has not been
questioned by the State of Florida in the past thirteen years. 42 U.S.C. 1996a (b) (1) enacted in 1994 states:


(b) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession,
or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bonafide traditional
ceremonial purposes in connecting with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by
the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or
discriminated against on the basis of such use; possession or
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise
applicable benefits under public assistance programs.

In light of 893.035 (11) Florida must permit sacramental peyote in Florida. Peyote is a schedule I substance.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that government may not prefer one religion over another Emerson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S. Ct 504, 511, 91 L.Ed 711(1947). Because government cannot prefer one religion over another, "(any enactment of the government) which either directly or indirectly discriminates or effects discrimination among religions is unconstitutional. United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp 261, 268 (E.D. Ark. 196.
The Supreme Court UDV Opinion at page eleven says:
But Congress' determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Controlled Substances Act itself. The Act contains a provision authorizing the Attorney General to "waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety." 21 U.S.C. §822(d). The fact that the Act itself contemplates that exempting certain people from its requirements would be "consistent with the public health and safety" indicates that congressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances should not carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to them.
And in fact an exemption has been made to the Schedule I ban for religious use. For the past 35 years, there has been a regulatory exemption for use of peyote - a Schedule I substance - by the Native American Church. See 21 CFR §1307.31 (2005). In 1994, Congress extended that exemption to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. See 42 U.S.C. §1996a(b)(1). Everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca - that, as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it "has a high potential for abuse," "has no currently accepted medical use" and has "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision," applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote.

Medical Necessity

The state also recognizes medical necessity Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ; State of Florida v. Elvy Mussika, case no. 684395 CFA 10, opinion Dec. 28, 1988; Sowell v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D549 (Fla. DCA Feb. 199.


If medical use is allowed without compromising governmental compelling interest than religious use must also be allowed. The state and federal government are required to at least give a compelling reason why one is allowed and the other cannot be. See Lukumi.

JUDICIALLY CRAFTED EXEMPTION FOR DMT

In UDV the U.S. Supreme Court created a judicially crafted exemption for DMT, a powerful schedule I controlled substance. Based on the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing stage, the UDV district court found that Hoasca contained a major hallucinogen (DMT), accompanied by MAO inhibitors; that the DMT caused severe, abrupt, disorienting visual, aural, and other sensory alterations. The severity of these is sufficient to require that the person not drive or operate machinery, not be off alone without an unimpaired observer, and be made aware prior to the ingestion of the Hoasca tea, that these temporary sensory distorting effects will occur. In addition, the MAO inhibitors could theoretically cause a severe injury or death if the person also ingested foods containing toxic substances that the MAO inhibitors would protect from normal digestion.

In the case of the DMT in the Hoasca tea - protecting the DMT allowed it to pass through the alimentary canal and into the brain without biochemical destruction in the stomach and small intestine. The same protection of DMT can cause injury or death when the toxic substances protected are injurious toxins from aged cheese, wine and meat, and other typical foods that are normally consumed safely - albeit in the absence of MAO inhibitors.

No DEA rescheduling hearings were held on DMT. The trial court in UDV, conducted preliminary hearings to gather scientifically derived evidence on the question of whether or not whether the importation and use of DMT can threaten public health and safety. The UDV church was acting without a federal DEA drug control license to establish and exercise their religion by importing, distributing, receiving and disbursing money for, and for using DMT, a Schedule I hallucinogen. DMT is known on the street as "the Businessman's LSD" because when smoked as a chemical powder or injected in aqueous solution, it precipitates a 45 minute intensive hallucinogenic or visionary experience that is the practical equivalent as an L.S.D. trip.

In the UDV case, the church was captured in possession and transport of over 3,000 doses of this Schedule I hallucinogen on that occasion. The church admitted that it had imported and distributed, received and expended
money's, purchased properties and hired labor to establish the church for exercise of use of DMT from 1993 through that date in 1999. Yet because of RFRA, no criminal charges were ever filed. When the church applied for an injunction and return of property, all the demands were met and the UDV church has operated with a DEA license to import and distribute DEA Schedule I DMT throughout the United States since December 10, 2004.

The determinative fact of the Compelling Interest Test applied in the UDV case is the fact that despite the powerful and potentially deadly effects of Hoasca tea, there was no nexus to the Public caused by the church's use of the Hoasca. As long as the use of the Hoasca was limited to church members, and the church members were monitored and protected while under the influence, there was and is no threat to public health and safety caused by the use of even such a powerful mind altering substance as DMT.

The UDV district court compared the Hoasca tea to peyote used by the Native American Church and found similar mind altering effects in a church with several hundred thousand members who have continued to use the peyote over 4000 years of recorded history - recorded in cave paintings in the desert - without any threat to public health and safety thereby caused.

Based on the facts presented in preliminary hearing, showing that the Schedule I drug DMT in Hoasca tea, and the Schedule I drug Mescaline in peyote, cause no threat to public health and safety when used in carefully monitored ceremonies, it was obvious to the Court that no Compelling Interest lay to prohibit the UDV church from receiving the proper licenses to import and distribute the Hoasca Tea. This Court should take note that the UDV Church never sought a license from the DEA in its filings. The district court sought to enable the DEA to effectively monitor what had been a non-event from 1993 through 1999 when the UDV church suffered its rape at the hands of DEA agents - that non-event being the illegal and illicit import and distribution of Hoasca by the church.

It is the biochemical nature and effect of Hoasca that determined the lack of threat to public health and safety not the issuance of a license. After all, the UDV church had been operating since 1993 in the United States, importing and distributing, recruiting members and otherwise establishing the church and its ceremonial use of Hoasca.

The UDV district court never got to the question of a least restrictive means of regulation where it found that there was no threat to public health and safety demonstrated by the Government (see page 58 of Docket Number 8.

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FOR ALCOHOL

In Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278, June 25, 2007, Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court compared marijuana prohibition with alcohol prohibition, writing,

"Reaching back still further, the current dominant opinion supporting the war on drugs in general, and our anti marijuana laws in particular, is reminiscent of the opinion that supported the nationwide ban on alcohol consumption when I was a student. While alcoholic beverages are now regarded as ordinary articles of commerce, their use was then condemned with the same moral fervor that now supports the war on drugs. The ensuing change in public opinion occurred much more slowly than the relatively rapid shift in Americans' views on the Vietnam War, and progressed on a state-by-state basis over a period of many years. But just as prohibition in the 1920's and early 1930's was secretly questioned by thousands of otherwise law-abiding patrons of bootleggers and speakeasies, today the actions of literally millions of otherwise law-abiding users of marijuana, n9 and of the majority of voters in each of the several States that tolerate medicinal uses of the product, n10 lead me to wonder whether the fear of disapproval by those in the majority is silencing opponents of the war on drugs. Surely our national experience with alcohol should make us wary of dampening speech suggesting -- however inarticulately -- that it would be better to tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use entirely.


n9 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21, n. 31, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 162 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (citing a Government estimate "that in 2000 American users spent $ 10.5 billion on the purchase of marijuana").


n10 Id., at 5, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 162 L. Ed. 2d 1 (noting that "at least nine States . . . authorize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes").(Stevens, J., dissenting, Slip Op. at page 16)

And in fact during national alcohol prohibition there was a sacramental religious exemption for alcohol, National Prohibition Act, Title II, Ch.85, § 3, 41 Stat. 308 [1919]. See dissent in Smith.

And in fact today there is an exemption in Florida State law allowing for the sacramental use of alcohol by minors, Florida Statutes 564.03 (5) Said wine and the sale thereof, when sold as herein provided and used for religious or sacramental purposes, shall be exempt from all other restrictions, regulations, and taxation now provided by the laws of the state for the sale and distribution of wine.

EXEMPTION OF ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO FROM THE CSA


Alcohol and tobacco are two of the most dangerous sacramental substances known to man and have both been exempted from the Controlled Substance Act, 21 USCS § 802 (6).

In Ravin v. State 527 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) the Alaska Supreme Court stated
"It appears that the use of marijuana as it is presently used in the United States today, does not constitute a public health problem of any significant dimensions. It is for instance, far more innocuous in terms of physiological and social danger than alcohol or tobacco. It appears that effects of marijuana on the individual are not serious enough to justify widespread concern at least as compared with the far more dangerous effects of alcohol, barbiturates and amphetamines." Id. at 506, 509-511 (footnote omitted).
And in In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W. 2d 878 (1972) the Michigan Supreme Court said,
"Comparison of the effects of marijuana on both the individual and society with the effects of other drug use demonstrates not only that there is no rational basis for classifying marijuana with the 'hard narcotics' but, also, that there is not even a rational basis for treating marijuana as a more dangerous drug than alcohol. 194 N.W. 2d at 881 (Emphasis added).
And in fact the evidence before this court shows that alcohol is far more dangerous than marijuana.
In the matter of alcohol there is no question that even relatively small amounts can be fatal and or induce severe impairment of motor skills See exhibit #(?) The Incidence and Role of Drugs in Fatally Injured Drivers 1992, DOT HS 808 065 "This study examined drug presence in blood specimens from nearly 2,000 drivers killed in motor vehicle crashes. Alcohol was found in slightly more than half of the specimens, other drugs in about 18% of the specimens. In about two-thirds of the drug cases, alcohol (usually at high levels), was also present. Analysis of crash responsibility suggested that drugs other than alcohol are most likely to present a hazard when combined with alcohol or other drugs."

The effects of alcohol on driving have even been compared to the effects of fairly strong doses of medical grade marijuana on driving, See Exhibit #(?) Marijuana and Actual Driving Performance 1993, DOT HS 808 078, "where volunteer subjects participated in several sessions in which they were dosed on alcohol, marijuana, or a placebo, then drove motor vehicles in various controlled on-road traffic situations (e.g., closed interstate highway). Dual-controlled vehicles were used, and a researcher was always along to take control if warranted. Marijuana was found to have a performance impairment effect equivalent to an alcohol blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level between .04 and .08 only in lane maintenance performance measures."

This study shows that in fact, while marijuana use can cause impairment in the ability to track right behind a vehicle to the front, in all other measurements, the stoned driver is a safer driver than when the same driver is tested straight - without the influence of marijuana. In contrast alcohol shows a marked depreciation in all categories of driving performance.

In the matter of tobacco Exhibit #(?) http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/exhibit_13.pdf gives a good contrast between the effects of tobacco use v marijuana use.

MORE FACTS FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY

The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 gives the Attorney General the power to reschedule a controlled substance if that substance does not meet the criteria for the schedule to which it has been assigned. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a). The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter DEA). See 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b). In 1988, the DEA Administrative Law Judge ruled that the danger of consuming massive amounts of marijuana was less then the danger of eating 10 raw potatoes or taking a bottle of aspirin. Furthermore, the Federal DEA Administrative Law Judge ruled, "marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man." In The Matter Of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, DEA Docket 86-22, Sept. 6, 1988, at pages 58-59.

According to the federal drug law, it is the DEA Administrative Law Judge who determines the actual danger caused by medical use of a drug The DEA ruling on threat to public health and safety reached by the DEA Administrative Law Judge on the question of threat to public health and safety is authoritative as to the religious acts of growing and using marijuana. The findings of the federal DEA Administrative Law Judge on the matter of Rescheduling Marijuana for medical use is legally controlling. From page 56 thru 70 the ALJ reports that marijuana is the safest therapeutical substance known to mankind; that there has never been a recorded injury or death caused by marijuana in 5000 years of recorded history and that the toxic dose of marijuana would be about 1500 lbs consumed within 15 minutes.
The lack of toxicity caused by ingestion of marijuana is the single greatest reason the Government cannot produce any proof of harms caused by the defendant growing and otherwise using marijuana. If a substance is non-toxic, then it can't cause harm to the user. If a substance cannot cause harm to a user, then it is very difficult if not impossible to prove that the user will cause harm to others by using that substance.

10 Raw Potatoes Equals 1500lbs of Marijuana as Poison

The ALJ compares marijuana in toxic dose to other common foods, over the counter pharmaceutical drugs, and things like potatoes. The toxicity of 1500 lbs of marijuana compares favorably with the toxicity of ten pounds of raw potatoes or a bottle of aspirin. Neither of these are characterized as threats to public health and safety - although thousands of Americans die every year from overuse of Aspirin. In contrast, there has never been a single scientifically verified injury or death caused by consumption of marijuana.

Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test, the Court must consider the findings of fact made by the Chief Administrative Law Judge for the DEA, established by the Federal CSA as the person of authority to review the classification of marijuana. Judge Young found as a fact that "Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man." This is a finding of fact under the very statute the State of Florida is claiming supports their compelling interest in assaulting the Defendant. The consideration of this fact is now mandatory under the compelling interest test of the RFRA, the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In The Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling, DEA Docket No. 86-22, September 6, 1988.

Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test, the Court must consider the finding of fact made by the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse established by the CSA to recommend marijuana's final placement or removal from the CSA. The Commission found the fact that marijuana is not a threat to public health and safety. This is a finding of fact under the very statute the State of Florida is claiming supports their compelling interest in assaulting the Defendant. Consideration of this fact is mandatory under the compelling interest test of the RFRA and the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the Fist Amendment. The First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/exhibit_21.pdf at page 150 states, "marihuana use is not such a grave problem that individuals who smoke marihuana, and possess it for that purpose, should be subject to criminal procedures." See Public Law 91-513 - Oct. 27, 1970 [84 Stat. 1280-1281] Part F - Advisory Commission - Establishment of Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse - SEC. 601. And see, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, October 10, 1970, 1970 USCCAN 4566, at pages 4578-1580 Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch...exhibit_20.pdf (explaining the uncertainty of Congress in placing marihuana in Schedule I of the CSA and the temporary nature of this placement while the Commission worked on its report). At page 56-57, the Commission wrote:
A large amount of research has been performed in man and animals regarding the immediate effect of marijuana on bodily processes. No conclusive evidence exist of any physical damage, disturbances of bodily processes or proven human fatalities attributable solely to even very high doses of marijuana. Recently, animal studies demonstrated a relatively large margin of safety between the psychoactive dose and the physical and behavioral toxic and lethal dose. Such studies seem to indicate that safe human study could be undertaken over a wide range of doses.

In 1972 the U.S. National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse recommended that the possession of marijuana for personal use no longer be an offense. It also recommended that casual distribution of small amounts for no remuneration or insignificant remuneration not involving profit would no longer be an offense. The recommendation was endorsed by the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the American Association for Public Health, the National Education Association, and the National Counsel of Churches. The consideration of these facts is now mandatory under the compelling interest test of the RFRA, the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test, the Court must consider the fact that the principle psychoactive ingredient in marijuana has been rescheduled twice because of its safety in medical use. In 1986, the DEA transferred the pharmaceutically pure psychoactive ingredient in marijuana in sesame oil encapsulated in soft gelatin capsules from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. 51 FR 17476, May 13, 1986 Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch...exhibit_02.pdf and in 1999, the DEA transferred the pharmaceutically pure psychoactive ingredient in marijuana in sesame oil encapsulated in soft gelatin capsules from Schedule II to Schedule III of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. 64 FR 35928, July 2, 1999 Exhibit#? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/sj1_exhibit_03.pdf . The consideration of this fact is now mandatory under the compelling interest test of the RFRA, the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test the Court must consider the fact that the Federal Government is currently supplying medical patients with marijuana under the federal "Compassionate Use Program." The Federal Government has been supplying a Florida resident 300 rolled marijuana cigarettes per month for the past ____?years. These are facts that must now be considered under the mandatory compelling interest test of the RFRA and the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test, the court must consider the fact that in 2007, the DEA Administrative Law Judge, established by Congress in the CSA as the authority for reviewing the placement of Marijuana in the Federal Controlled Substances Act, found as a finding of fact that the National Institute on Drug Abuse has a monopoly on the supply of marijuana for scientific and medical research and that the National Institute on Drug Abuse has been withholding supplies of marijuana for legitimate medical research Exhibit #? http://www.ethiopianzioncopticchurch.org/Federal/sj1_exhibit_04.pdf . The consideration of this fact is now mandatory under the compelling interest test of the RFRA, the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Under the strict scrutiny required by UDV and the compelling interest test, the court must consider the fact that in Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278, June 25, 2007, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court wrote, "Surely our national experience with alcohol should make us wary of dampening speech suggesting -- however inarticulately -- that it would be better to tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use entirely." (Stevens, J., dissenting, Slip Op. at page 16).
The Defendant has never injured anyone and this fact must now be considered under the compelling interest test of the RFRA, the RLUIPA and Equal Protection in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
All of these facts (the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse findings of fact, the 1988 DEA findings of fact, the 1986 and 1999 DEA rescheduling of THC, the Federal DOT studies and the lack of harm caused by the Defendant's Sacramental use of Marijuana) which come from the Government themselves, prove that the Defendant cannot injure anyone by using Marijuana as his Sacrament, because these facts prove that no one has ever been injured from using Marijuana.
In 2006 the Supreme Court ruled that states have the authority to set the standard for medical practice as defined by federal drug statutes. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904; 163 L. Ed. 2d 748 (2006).

Eleven states have determined that marijuana has medical use. The State of Iowa is among these states. Iowa Code Chapter 204. Two of five people currently receiving marijuana from the federal government live in Iowa. These two patients have been receiving 300 rolled marijuana cigarettes each month from the federal government for the past 15 years. Letters from the Iowa Department of General Services say that these two patients are approved by the Iowa Board of Pharmacy Examiners to use and possess marijuana on state property. If medical users can use marijuana in public without any threat to public health or safety, religious use of marijuana is entitled to the same respect.


Add paragraph for Florida here.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE HYBRID RIGHTS MENTIONED IN SMITH

"The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake. Id. , at 881-882." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-514 (1997).
"And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ('An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed')." Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 871, 881 (1990).
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed. See, e. g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981). According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority. See, e. g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery , 417 U.S. , at 575; Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. , at 482-485; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. , at 462. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. See, e. g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-246 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (197; Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY ARTICLE I SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT AND EXERCISE USING CANNABIS OR "MARIJUANA" AS A SACRAMENT.
RELIGION AND PRIVACY


Freedom of Religion is guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida.

The Florida Constitution contains an explicit right to individual privacy that has no parallel in the United States Constitution.

Article I section 23 of the Florida Constitution Right of Privacy-Every natural person has the right to be left alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided here.

In 1980, Florida amended its Constitution to secure personal privacy as a fundamental right of the highest order Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271, 1275-76 (Fla. 1996)

The courts of Florida have recognized that the right to privacy is one of the most important rights citizens of Florida possess.

The right of privacy has been described as the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service Inc, 500 So 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)

"Article I, Section 23, was intentionally phrased in strong terms."

Winfield v. Div. of Paramutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (fla. 1985)

Recognizing the importance that the citizens of this state attach to their

privacy, the Florida Supreme Court has held that:

The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe
demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts
the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy.
The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes
its goal through the use of the least restrictive means. Id at 547

In Public Health v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989), Dubreuil,

629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) the Florida Supreme Court applied the compelling interest test in both cases and held that the state's interest in preserving the life of the mother, and thus, in maintaining a home with two parents did not override the mother's right to privacy in making decisions concerning her health based on religious doctrine. At issue was the right of an expectant mother to refuse a blood transfusion on religiously motivated grounds.


The right to privacy was made explicit in Alaska by an amendment to the state constitution Alaska Constitution Art. I, 22

The Alaska Supreme Court in Ravin v. State, 537 P. 2d 494 (1975) found personal use by an adult to be protected in the confines of the home.

"We first address petitioner's contentions that his constitutionally protected right to privacy compels the conclusion that the State of Alaska is prohibited from penalizing the private possession and use of marijuana.
Ravin's basic thesis is that there exists under the federal and Alaska constitutions a fundamental right to privacy, the scope of which is sufficiently broad to encompass and protect the possession of marijuana for personal use. Given this fundamental constitutional right, the State would then would have the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest in prohibiting possession of marijuana. In light of these controlling principles, petitioner argues that the evidence submitted below by both sides demonstrates that marijuana is a relatively innocuous substance, at least as compared with other less-restricted, and that nothing even approaching a compelling state interest was proven by the State......."


The evidence, which was presented at the hearing before the district court consisted primarily of several expert witnesses familiar with various medical and social aspects of marijuana use. Numerous written reports and books were also introduced into evidence.

The district court found from the evidence that the effects of marijuana on the individual are not serious enough to justify widespread concern, at least as compared with the far more dangerous effects of alcohol, barbiturates and amphetiamines....

Thus the district court concluded, "that no adequate justification for the state's intrusion into the citizen's right to privacy by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for personal consumption in the home has been shown. The privacy of the individual's home cannot be breached absent a persuasive showing of a close and substantial relationship of the intrusion to a legitimate governmental interest. Here, mere scientific doubts will not suffice. The state must demonstrate a need based on proof that the public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not applied. ,

Even in cases where a state has not specifically legislated an explicit fundamental right to privacy, the right to privacy becomes explicit and fundamental in conjunction with other fundamental rights.

In NORML v. Griffin B. Bell, Civ. A. No 1897-73 (Feb. 11, 1980)
NORML argues that the right of privacy in general and
privacy in the home forbids any governmental ban on private
possession and use of marijuana. Such a reading stretches
the right of privacy too far. This right exists only in conjunction
with specific constitutional guarantees that serve as the
substantive basis for the privacy right, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 712-13, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1165-66, 47 L.Ed. 2d 405 (1976) The
recognized substantive rights are " 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' " id. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 1166
(citation omitted), and "[t]he activities detailed as being within
this definition....relat[e] to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education. " Id.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a fundamental right to use marijuana in religious Establishment an Exercise See Bauer , Valrey and MDMCR , the Forchion case in Pennsylvania has also recognized a fundamental right to use marijuana in religious Establishment and Exercise and the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to use a controlled substance in religious Establishment and Exercise See UDV (See also Raich).

The Fundamental Right to Privacy restores the compelling interest test and all facts cited above must also now be considered under the strict scrutiny required by the Fundamental Right to Privacy.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant has the right to Communion with his Creator through the Assembly and Worship with members of his Faith. That right cannot be denied without evidence of an injury to another person. The mere fact that Florida made Marijuana illegal does establish an injury where no injury exists. Florida has failed to produce any evidence to support their enforcement of the Florida drug law against the Defendant for using Marijuana as his Sacrament.
The State has failed to introduce any evidence that anyone has ever been hurt by the Defendant's Sacramental use of Marijuana.
The State has failed to introduce any evidence that anyone could ever be hurt by the Defendant's Sacramental use of Marijuana.
Wherefore, because the Defendant has met his burden of proof under the Compelling Interest Test and the State has failed to meet their burden of proof under the compelling interest test, and because the Defendant was not in public, and could therefore not pose a threat to public health and safety, or act against public morals while in the sincere and legitimate practice of his religion in the sanctity of his own sanctuary, which was literally trespassed upon by the Agents and Officers. The Defendant through his attorney respectfully moves this court to follow the law and dismiss these charges.


Respectfully Submitted,



Joshua J. Snider pro se
August 23, 2007
















State Medical Statutes: Since 1988, eleven states, Alaska Statutes § 17.37 (2007), California Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (2006), Colorado Constitution Article XVIII, Section 14 (2006), Hawaii Revised Statutes § 329-121 (2006), 22 Maine Revised Statutes § 2383-B (2005), Montana Code Annotated § 50-46-101 (2006), Nevada Constitution Article 4 § 38 (2006) - Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 453A.010 (2006), Oregon Revised Statutes § 475.300 (2006), Rhode Island General Laws § 21-28.6-1 (2006), 18 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 4471 (2006), Revised Code Washington (ARCW) § 69.51A.005 (2006), have passed laws protecting the medical use of marijuana. All of these states allow medical marijuana use, possession, and cultivation, proving that there is no immediate threat to public health and safety from these activities (See the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law attached to this Complaint for specific language).

From the Memorandum: 10. Alaska Statutes 17.37.070( (2007):
"medical use" means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, use or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia related to the administration of marijuana to alleviate a debilitating medical condition under the provisions of this chapter and AS 11.71.090.
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11. California Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(d) (2006):
Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
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12. Colorado Constitution Article XVIII, Section 14(1)(b) (2006):
"Medical use" means the acquisition, possession, production, use, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia related to the administration of such marijuana to address the symptoms or effects of a patient's debilitating medical condition, which may be authorized only after a diagnosis of the patient's debilitating medical condition by a physician or physicians, as provided by this section.
_____________________
13. Hawaii Revised Statutes § 329-121 (2006):
"Medical use" means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, distribution, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the administration of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms or effects of a qualifying patient's debilitating medical condition. For the purposes of "medical use", the term distribution is limited to the transfer of marijuana and paraphernalia from the primary caregiver to the qualifying patient.
_____________________
14. 22 Maine Revised Statutes § 2383-B(5)(H) (2005):
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for possession, possession with the intent to furnish, furnishing or cultivation of a usable amount of marijuana under section 2383, Title 15, section 3103 or Title 17-A, chapter 45 that the defendant was a designated care giver under this subsection if the person to whom the marijuana was to be furnished or for whom it was cultivated was an eligible patient.
_____________________
15. Montana Code Annotated § 50-46-102(5) (2006):
"Medical use" means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the consumption of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms or effects of a qualifying patient's debilitating medical condition.
_____________________
16. Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 453A.120 (2006):
"Medical use of marijuana" means: 1. The possession, delivery, production or use of marijuana; 2. The possession, delivery or use of paraphernalia used to administer marijuana; or 3. Any combination of the acts described in subsections 1 and 2, as necessary for the exclusive benefit of a person to mitigate the symptoms or effects of his chronic or debilitating medical condition.
_____________________
17. Oregon Revised Statutes § 475.300( (2006):
"Medical use of marijuana" means the production, possession, delivery, or administration of marijuana, or paraphernalia used to administer marijuana, as necessary for the exclusive benefit of a person to mitigate the symptoms or effects of the person's debilitating medical condition..
_____________________
18. Rhode Island General Laws § 21-28.6-3(4) (2006):
"Medical use" means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the consumption of marijuana to alleviate a registered qualifying patient's debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the medical condition.
_____________________
19. 18 Vermont Statutes Annotated § 4472(10) (2006):
"Use for symptom relief" means the acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, transfer, or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the administration of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms or effects of a registered patient's debilitating medical condition which is in compliance with all the limitations and restrictions of this subchapter.
_____________________
20. Revised Code Washington (ARCW) § 69.51A.010(1) (2006):
"Medical use of marijuana" means the production, possession, or administration of marijuana, as defined in RCW 69.50.101(q), for the exclusive benefit of a qualifying patient in the treatment of his or her terminal or debilitating illness.